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Draft prepared for 2012 meeting of American Political Science Association.
Abstract. Existing research shows that the ideas of judges matter for judicial behavior both on
the bench (decision making) and off the bench (lobbying and mobilization for institutional
change). Yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the content and distribution of these
ideas and even less evidence and fewer theoretical propositions regarding the manner in which
ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. Addressing these empirical and theoretical gaps, I survey
judges in the Mexican state of Michoacán and apply techniques of network analysis. The project
makes four main contributions: (1) original data on the attitudes of judges regarding prominent
institutional and jurisprudential changes shaping the legal landscape in Mexico; (2) egocentric
data on network structure for the sampled judges; (3) sociocentric data on network structure at
the level of judicial district, state supreme court, and entire state generated by aggregating the
egocentric data; and (4) a mixed-methods analysis of the causal relationship between network
features and judicial attitudes, drawing on egocentric methods, sociocentric methods, and
personal interviews with focal individuals. Complementing literatures on political socialization,
policy diffusion, and complex systems, the analysis clarifies our understanding of the role of
judicial networks in strengthening democracy and the rule of law.
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Introduction
Effective courts are widely regarded as vital to both democracy and development (O‘Donnell
2001; UNDP 2004), and existing research in both judicial decision making and institutional
change highlights the role of institutional insiders (judges) and their ideas in shaping key legal
and judicial outcomes (Couso 2010; Hilbink 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012; Woods 2008, 2009;
Woods and Hilbink 2009; Couso and Hilbink 2011; Rodríguez-Garavito 2011). That is, judges
play pivotal roles in either helping or hindering processes of legal change depending on their
attitudes towards that change.
Yet, despite the importance of judges‘ ideas for key judicial outcomes, we know very
little about the content and distribution of these ideas, especially outside the United States, and
even less about how these ideas transfer or diffuse among judges. How do ideas spread among
judges? Why do different attitudes regarding institutional design, jurisprudence, and other forms
of legal change diffuse among legal elites? Addressing these empirical and theoretical gaps, I
conduct a network analysis of the diffusion of ideas among all judges in the Mexican state of
Michoacán. Building on recent network analyses of the law (Fowler et al. 2007; Katz et al. 2011;
Lupu and Voeten 2012), the project makes four main contributions: (1) original data on the
attitudes of judges regarding prominent institutional and jurisprudential changes shaping the
legal landscape in Mexico; (2) egocentric network data for the individual judges; (3) sociocentric
network data for the whole state generated by aggregating the egocentric data; and (4) an
analysis of the causal relationship between network structure and judicial attitudes. Indeed, the
local level of analysis increases analytic leverage in the study of network dynamics (Sokhey and
Djupe 2011) and also contributes to growing literatures on subnational politics (Snyder 2001;
Beer 2003; Chavez 2004). Complementing literatures on political socialization, policy diffusion,
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and complex systems, I find a relationship between the social structure among judges and their
attitudes, i.e., ―networked justice.‖ Given the vital role of judges and their ideas in shaping
institutional design, jurisprudence, and other legal changes, a better understanding of this
phenomenon clarifies the role of judges in strengthening democracy and the rule of law.
Looking ahead, I first motivate the emphasis on judicial networks by highlighting (1) the
emphasis existing research places on the role of ideas in explaining key judicial outcomes and
(2) how a network perspective can be harnessed to examine the origin and spread of these ideas.
The following section introduces the reader to the landscape of legal change in Mexico,
emphasizing the extent to which patterns seen in Mexico are illustrative of patterns seen
elsewhere in the region and in other parts of the world. Subsequently, the fourth section outlines
working hypotheses, and in the fifth section I present the data and introduce the sequence of
methods. Notably, the egocentric, sociocentric, and qualitative portions of the analysis require
different methods, and the approach to each of these phases is outlined separately in this section.
The empirical analysis is concentrated in the sixth and seventh sections: the first part of the sixth
section examines the egocentric data, and the second part analyzes the sociocentric data
generated by aggregating the egocentric data; the seventh (and penultimate) section offers
qualitative evidence from personal interviews with focal individuals. This mixed-methods
approach draws on several streams of evidence and techniques, engaging in a process of dataand method-triangulation to maximize the validity of conclusions (Denzin 1978; Tarrow 1995).
Overall, I find consistent and robust evidence that social structure influences judicial
attitudes. This is evident in the two different statistical approaches required to examine
egocentric and sociocentric data, and in the qualitative component, as well. That is, the legal
attitudes judges hold are shaped by those with whom they interact. In short, whom they know
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shapes what they know. I conclude with a discussion of broader implications and future research.
Why Judicial Networks?
Ideas are a powerful predictor of judicial decisions and institutional change. Similarly, network
analysis is a powerful tool to examine ideas and how these transfer among relevant actors.
In decision making—judicial behavior on the bench—attitudes, values, and ideology play
a critical role in determining the willingness of judges to review particular cases, to address
certain issues, and in determining the final outcome of cases. The US literature holds ample
evidence of this phenomenon, perhaps most dramatically in the emphasis on political ideology in
the ―attitudinal model‖ of decision making (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002), also called ―ideological
voting‖ (Sunstein et al. 2004, 2006). Scholars of comparative judicial politics are increasingly
finding similar results.2 Indeed, the comparative literature is moving beyond the US focus on
political ideology, understood as an actor‘s placement along a conventional left–right continuum,
to address other kinds of ideational variation among judges, including ―judicial role conception‖
(Hilbink forthcoming 2012), understood as a judge‘s view of the appropriateness of challenging
actions by dominant political actors (see also Couso 2010; Couso and Hilbink 2011).
In addition to shaping judicial decision making, ideational factors also motivate and
shape the behavior of judges off the bench—activities of judges for and against institutional
reforms. Evidence from the United States includes ideologically progressive, rights-oriented
expansion and contraction of the judicial agenda (Epp 1998) and court jurisdiction (Gillman
2002, 2008). Comparative evidence includes variants of similar movements in Canada, Britain,
2

Evidence includes studies in Brazil (Engelmann 2004; Desposato, Ingram, and Lannes 2011; see also Kapiszewski

2011, though she finds pragmatic considerations outweigh the influence of ideology), Chile (Hilbink 2007a,
speaking of ―institutional ideology‖), Mexico (Sanchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011), Colombia (Nunes 2010), and
Portugal (Amaral-Garcia et al. 2009).
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and India (Epp 1998), neoliberal judicial elites in Israel, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand
(Hirschl 2000, 2004), and progressive judges in Spain (Hilbink 2007b), Israel (Woods 2008),
Mexico (Ingram 2012b), and Brazil (Engelmann 2004; 2007). In sum, institutional insiders
(judges) and their subjective, nonmaterial commitments play an important role in explaining
crucial judicial outcomes. Judges can either help or hinder institutional design, jurisprudence,
and other forms of legal change depending on their attitudes towards said change.
Given the importance of judges and their ideas, the natural next move would be to
consider what these ideas are and how one judge comes to hold them while another does not—
where do ideas come from? Yet, while we know the ideas of judges matter, there is little
empirical evidence regarding the content and distribution of these ideas and even less evidence
regarding the how these ideas transfer or diffuse among judges.
First, we know very little about the content and distribution of judicial attitudes,
especially outside the United States. That is, we know ideas matter and have a general sense of
the kinds of ideas that matter, but little research to date has sought to systematically examine
judges‘ attitudes about a range of institutional and jurisprudential issues.3 In part, this empirical
gap is due to a degree of vagueness in the term ―ideas,‖ or what social movement scholars refer
to as the ―ephemeral, amorphous nature of the subject matter‖ (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996, 6, referring to the ideational framing process). To be clear, current research does
operationalize attitudinal orientations among judges.4 While existing metrics offer valuable and
3
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For instance, several projects measure judicial ideology as a categorical variable capturing party affiliation and,

therefore, ideology as the party of the appointing executive (e.g., Sunstein et al. 2004, 2006). In the United States,
Segal-Cover scores improve on this method by examining newspaper editorials for each Supreme Court nominee
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increasingly sophisticated contributions, they seek to place judges on a conventional left–right
ideological spectrum, and some, like the Martin-Quinn scores, rely on revealed preferences from
behavior that may be highly strategic, in which case these measures may not coincide with
sincere preferences. Further, these metrics do not ask judges themselves about their attitudes.
Here, I conceptualize ideas specifically as attitudes towards existing legal reforms (e.g., the
creation of judicial councils) and styles of decision making (e.g., whether lower-court judges
should always have to defer to the decisions of higher courts). The survey questionnaire captures
a wide range of attitudes regarding these institutional and jurisprudential topics and relies on
judges‘ self reports to identify their attitudes.
Second, we know even less about how these attitudes transfer or diffuse among judges.
The overwhelming majority of research treats judicial attitudes as an explanatory variable in a
broad endeavor to understand the consequences of these attitudes for judicial behavior. Where
attitudes do become an outcome of interest, studies tend to focus on static attributes or
characteristics of actors as being the principal forces that shape ideas. Ideational profiles are
understood as the product of an individual‘s features, e.g., socioeconomic status. This may in
fact be what is taking place. However, network analysis suggests that individual characteristics
are only part of the story and that an individual‘s social relations and interactions with other
individuals may account for a larger part of the origin of a judge's ideational profile. Indeed,
these relational dynamics may be most of the story.
and coding paragraphs as either liberal or conservative, yielding an index (–1 to 1) for ideology (Segal and Cover
1989; Segal and Spaeth 2002). More recently, Martin-Quinn scores draw on techniques developed for legislative
roll-call analysis to generate estimates of judicial ideal points based on the actual votes of judges (Martin and Quinn
2002, 2007). Following the Martin-Quinn example, Desposato, Ingram, and Lannes (2011) estimate ideal points for
justices on Brazil‘s constitutional court.
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To be clear, attention to relational sources of legal change and law reform networks is not
new. Indeed, the idea of social networks and their influence is implicit in much social movement
literature, including the legal mobilization scholarship in the United States and abroad (McCann
1994; Epp 1998; Hilbink 2007b; Woods 2008). For instance, Woods explains the emergence of
―consensus around norms‖ (2008, 23) as the result of sustained interaction within relatively
diffuse ―judicial communities‖—groups of judges who also share similar demographic
characteristics such as education and professional trajectory. However, the treatment of network
concepts is informal in the research cited above.5 Even where the notion of networks and
diffusion effects are referenced more explicitly, network concepts remain largely informal (e.g.,
Langer 2007; Rodríguez-Garavito 2011; Ingram 2012b).
More recently, a small number of scholars have framed the explanation of the diffusion
of legal ideas in explicitly structural, network analytic terms, harnessing a fuller set of
conceptual, measurement, and analytic techniques for the study of judicial networks. Fowler et
al. (2007) and Fowler and Jeon (2008) examine citation networks of US Supreme Court
precedents, identifying the most central or influential cases. Similarly, Lupu and Voeten (2012)
examine the citation networks of the European Court of Human Rights. In international relations,
Fariss and Schnakenberg (2009) apply network analysis to the study of human rights regimes and
the incidence of torture. Back in the United States, Katz and Stafford (2010) use law clerks to
proxy relations among US federal judges, constructing a network of the connectedness of the
federal judiciary and operationalizing judicial authority or power according to the structural
location of actors in this network. Closely related to the present study of ideational contagion
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For instance, a ―justice network‖ (red de justicia) might be a group of interested individuals or an informal

association of groups, not a formal, structural representation of a network.
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among judges, Katz et al. (2011) examine the ―infectiousness of ideas‖ among the professoriate
in 184 ABA-accredited law schools in the United States. Using measures of network centrality,
they conclude that law schools that send more of their graduates to tenure-track positions at other
law schools become ―hubs‖ of legal influence, establishing the hierarchical structure of legal
education. The architecture of these relations serves as the conduit for diffusing legal ideas,
much as I propose judges' relational architecture shapes the diffusion of ideas regarding reform.
Network analysis also has some methodological advantages for examining the diffusion
of ideas. For instance, conventional data sets and statistical techniques view units as independent
of each other. That is, judges‘ attitudes are seen as a function of their own individual attributes
(e.g., age, sex, education, income), and perhaps some contextual events (e.g., financial crisis),
but not as a function of their colleagues‘ attitudes, which would violate the independence
assumption underlying most analyses. Thus, the adoption of a new idea is fundamentally
understood as an individualistic or atomistic phenomenon, based on the properties, features, or
attributes of the individual. Conversely, a network perspective conceptualizes units of analysis as
interpendent; judicial attitudes may be shaped in part by individual attributes, but they are also a
function of the attitudes of other judges. One‘s attitude is explicitly dependent on the attitude of
one‘s neighbors! Echoing Woods and earlier social movement theory, ideas spread among
individuals who are in ―intense regular contact with each other‖ (Ferree and Miller 1977, 34;
cited in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 9). Thus, a long line of research applies network
analysis to problems and puzzles of diffusion, contagion, and innovation, finding that ―an
individual‘s direct contacts influence his or her decision to adopt or not adopt an innovation‖
(Valente 1995, 31).
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Judicial Reform Networks in Mexico
Mexico offers a rich environment in which to study justice reform networks. Historically
suffering from weak and dysfunctional courts (see, e.g., Cumaraswamy 2002), in the last twenty
years—through a slow political opening starting in 1977 and after a transition to democracy in
2000—Mexico has advanced several high-profile reforms to address the widely recognized
weakness of justice institutions. The two most prominent reforms target judicial councils and
criminal procedure. First, a national reform in 1994 reshaped the supreme court and created a
federal judicial council (Fix-Zamudio and Fix-Fierro 1996; Fix-Fierro 2003, 2004; Finkel 2008).
Mexico‘s thirty-two states were supposed to follow suit, but there was no explicit directive to do
so. Second, following regional developments in criminal law (Langer 2007), a 2008 criminal
procedure reform has revolutionized the way Mexican judges think about criminal procedure and
due process, transitioning from an inquisitorial process traditionally associated with civil law
systems to an adversarial process associated with common law systems (Ingram and Shirk 2010).
This time, the federal reform mandated that all thirty-two states (including the federal district of
Mexico City) adopt local versions of the new criminal procedure by 2016. Both reforms have
filtered through the states in a highly uneven pattern (Ingram 2012a, 2012b).
Beyond critical reforms that deserve attention for their substantive importance, (Ingram
2012b) offers qualitative evidence of judges who act as reform entrepreneurs or agents of
socialization, constituting the kind of justice reform networks the present study seeks to
formalize in a more systematic manner. For instance, a group of judges from the state of
Michoacán formed a close-knit group that promoted the judicial council reform in that state from
2002 onwards, and members of this group have since also promoted the criminal procedure
reform. The judicial council reform was ultimately passed in 2005, and on January 13, 2012, the
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state passed the vital new code of criminal procedure. Several members of this group, led by
state supreme court judge Alejandro González Gómez and state electoral judge Jaime del Rio,
studied law together in Spain at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and were influenced by
the teachings and experiences of progressive judges who lived through Spain‘s transition from
Franco‘s dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s and 1980s, including the ―Democratic
Justice‖ movement examined by Hilbink (2007b). Further, judges like Alejandro González also
had academic careers—either before joining the bench or after—and interviews conducted in
2008 and 2012 showed that exposure to these individuals‘ academic and professional presence
influenced colleagues and newer generations of legal professionals.
On case selection, Michoacán is a good case for both methodological and nonmethodological reasons. First, early on there were fair questions about the feasibility of this kind
of project. A network approach to ideational diffusion among judges is novel, and it was
reasonable to expect that judges might not be willing to answer questions about their relational
structure, so the ability to generate original data for the project at first seemed unlikely,
especially in a less developed country facing serious challenges in public safety and security.
Thus, it made sense to start somewhere where prior work indicated at least some form of
network influence, even if informally. My own prior research provided this with regard to the
group of judges that formed around Alejandro González and Jaime Del Rio. Thus, the research
design returns to a site of prior research for a more systematic examination of how relations
among judges shape their ideas. Further, given the breadth and depth of legal reforms being
pursued in Mexico, the country offers a rich environment in which to study the diffusion of ideas
among judges that might help or hinder such a process. However, as in many larger federal
systems, the implementation of many reforms in Mexico—including the judicial council and
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criminal procedure reforms—are left to the states. Many states have not promoted these reforms,
while others have advanced far. In this regard, a good state in which to conduct this research is
one in which there is some evidence of variation in the attitudes of judges towards these reforms.
Again, Michoacán provides this variation to a much greater degree than other states. For
instance, the judicial council reform of 2005 was a highly contested process, due in part to a deep
division among judges regarding the composition and powers of the council. Lastly,
methodological reasons justify the focus on diffusion within a single state or geographic region.
As noted by a recent review of network research, ―instead of worrying about national
representativeness, progress may come from in-depth study in smaller settings‖ (Sokhey and
Djupe 2011, 58).

Hypotheses
The discussion above leads to the general expectation that judges who interact more intensely,
more frequently, and are otherwise more ―connected‖ within their profession and legal
community will share similar normative outlooks about legal and institutional change. These
judges and their connections constitute what I call ―justice reform networks.‖ By understanding
the relational sources of judges‘ ideas, we can understand the social origins of strong courts, or
―networked justice.‖
Specifically, I expect to find evidence showing: (1) variation in the content of judges‘
opinions regarding a variety of recent and ongoing reforms; (2) variation in the structure of
relations among judges; and (3) a causal relationships between the structure of judges‘ relations
on their opinions about justice reforms. That is, whom judges know affects what they know. I
anticipate the following working hypotheses.
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H1a: In ego networks, attitude towards reform should vary positively with network size and
density.
H1b: In whole networks, attitude towards reform should vary positively with how “central”
one’s social location is in the whole network.
H2: Attitude towards reform should vary positively with the attitude(s) of network neighbor(s).
H3: Hypothesis 2 should be conditioned by the strength of relations among network neighbors.

Regarding H1a and H1b, measures of network size and density, as well as various
measures of network centrality, draw on existing literature. Network size is simply the number of
alters in any ego network, and network density captures the number of existing ties as a
proportion of the total possible ties. Network centrality can be unpacked into at least four distinct
forms of centrality: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality
is the total number of ties for each node. Degree centrality is therefore analogous to network size,
except that in the ego network analysis the range is one to five (1–5), whereas in the sociocentric
analysis the range is much larger. Betweenness centrality captures the extent to which a node is
on the shortest path between two other nodes. Nodes with high values on this measure are often
thought of as being good conduits, bridges, brokers, or gatekeepers between other nodes.
Because more information should flow through these nodes than others with lower values, these
nodes are exposed to more information and should therefore adopt new ideas and attitudes faster
or sooner than others. Closeness centrality captures the ease with which a node can reach all
other nodes in the network. High values on any of these measures indicate that the individual is
―more likely to receive information and influence‖ (Valente 1995, 53). Therefore, these

11

measures should be associated with ―innovativeness‖ or in the case of ideational diffusion, the
adoption of new ideas.

Methods and Data
Network Analysis
The network perspective requires a shift from focusing on the attributes of independent units to a
focus on the relational ties among these units, rendering the structure of data explicitly
dependent. This analytic shift has implications for descriptive and causal analysis.
Networks are usually studied as either (1) whole networks (also called ―sociocentric‖), or
(2) personal or ―ego‖ networks (also called ―egocentric‖). In whole networks, a boundary
establishes the outer perimeter of the network (e.g., a classroom), and information must be
collected on every single member within that perimeter (e.g., every student in class) and on the
ties between that member and every other member. Personal networks examine one individual
(the ―ego‖) and the quantity and quality of relations with others (―alters‖), and egos can be
sampled from a broader population (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005;
see Appendix A for discussion of strengths and weakness of each approach).
No single method is perfect, so relying on a multi-method approach leverages the
―diversity of imperfections‖ (Brewer and Hunter 1989, 16–17; also Tashakkori and Teddlie
1998, 40–42) to strengthen the validity of conclusions. To this end, I employ a mixed-methods
strategy in two ways: (1) in the combination of ego (egocentric) and whole (sociocentric)
network data and analysis; and (2) in the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.
First, I examine only the egocentric data. Since each ego network is sampled independently of
the others, these data can be studied with standard regression techniques that treat each
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observation as independent. Given the ordinal nature of the response variable, an ordered
probabilistic regression model is applied. Second, I aggregate the egocentric data to form
sociocentric networks, thereby drawing on the strengths of each type of data to offset their
weaknesses in Appendix A.
The quantitative analysis of network influence in sociocentric networks focuses on two
approaches: (1) network disturbance models, and (2) network effects models. Network
disturbance models (Dow 1979, 1984; Dow et al. 1982) derived from geographic, spatial analysis
have been popular for several decades. However, Leenders (2002) and Dow (2007, 346)
highlight that autocorrelation in the error (i.e., disturbance) term can be due to at least three
different sources: incorrect model specification (e.g., linear vs. nonlinear), omitted variable(s), or
adjustment to perceived values in an ego‘s social context. It is only this last influence that is
properly a network influence. Even here, however, the model conceptualizes influence more as
reaction than interaction (Leenders 2002, cited in Dow 2007, 346). For this reason, Dow (2007,
346) notes that the network effects model may be more appropriate than the network disturbance
model, though extensions including both types of influence are also possible (e.g., Dow 2007,
344; Butts 2008, 39).6
Given the ordinal response variable and following Dow (2007, 2008), I employ a twostage, conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) network autocorrelation effects model.
Equations (1) and (2) represent the initial structural model in matrix notation:

6

In R, the ―lnam‖ function in the ―sna‖ package allows the specification of two weight matrices, W1 and W2, where

W1 is a vector of autoregressive (AR) or network effects parameters, and W2 is a vector of moving average (MA) or
network disturbance parameters (Butts 2008).
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y = ρWy + X1β1 + ɛ

(1)

Wy = X2β2 + ν

(2)

where y is a N x 1 vector of the ordinal outcome of interest, W is a square N x N weights matrix
that specifies the presence (binary matrix; hereafter referred to as W1) or strength (valued
matrix, referred to as W2) of relations among all dyads of judges; X is an N x k matrix of
explanatory variables, ɛ and ν are vectors of error terms, and ρ and β are vectors of regression
coefficients. Thus, Wy captures the multiplication between W and y that yields a vector of the
weighted average of the quantity y among an individual‘s social relations. Equations (1) and (2)
reduce to equation (3) below,

y = ρWy + X1β1 + λν + η

(3)

where η = ɛ - λν. Regressing Wy on instrumental variables7 yields residuals ν, which can be
plugged into Equation (3) (see Dow 2008 for detailed discussion of method).
Lastly, the research design combines these two forms of quantitative network analysis
(personal and whole) with in-depth, qualitative network analysis. Following Hollstein (2011), I
sequence the qualitative phase of work after the quantitative phase, selecting five judges for
7

Dow notes that the ―ideal set of instruments for the spatial (and thus also network) effects model are the linear

combinations of the exogenous variables X1 [in equation 1] and powers of the network weights matrix (Dow 2008,
402, citing Kelejian and Prucha 1998; see also Dow 2008, fn. 8). I use linear combinations of W and the exogenous
variables sex, position, and judicial district. On use of instruments in network regressions, see also Huckfeldt and
Sprague (1987; 1993).
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personal, semi-structured interviews using qualitative network techniques. The triangulation of
data and methods inherent in the combination of methods enhances the validity of both the
measures and the final conclusions regarding causation (Hollstein 2011; see also Padgett in
Fowler et al. 2011).
Data
A survey of judges in the Mexican state of Michoacán generated original data for this study. The
state has a total of 110 judges, including first-instance jueces and second-instance magistrados.
Of this total, a primary effort of telephonic contacts sought a full census of these judges but
obtained eighty-five responses. A follow-up effort via email obtained an additional five
responses, yielding a total of ninety completed questionnaires, for a response rate of 81.82
percent.8 Once the initial data analysis was complete, personal interviews with five focal
individuals were conducted in the state capital, Morelia, in January 2012.
The survey instrument consists of three batteries: (1) opinion, (2) ―name generator,‖ and
(3) ―name interpreter.‖ Opinion questions register the attitudes of the respondent (ego) towards a
series of recent and ongoing legal and institutional reforms, asking egos to gauge the degree to
which they agree with a statement, following a Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree). For instance, sample questions include statements such as ―the reform that created the
judicial council was a good idea‖ and ―lower court judges can diverge from the decisions of
higher courts.‖ In the second battery, ―name generator‖ questions ask egos to identify up to ten
8

The polling firm Data Opinión Pública y Mercados (DataOPM), based in Mexico City, conducted the telephonic

interviews in June and July 2011. At DataOPM, Pablo Parás and Carlos López managed the survey administration,
and both have conducted previous surveys in the justice sector in Mexico. I am grateful to them both and to their
staff for valuable feedback on early drafts of the questionnaire and for communications during the survey
administration that enhanced its feasibility and interpretation.
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people with whom they ―discuss important matters relating to legal and judicial reforms.‖ This
phrasing is borrowed from established surveys that seek to identify the individuals with whom
the ego most interacts on particular subject matters (e.g., network batteries in the United States
from General Social Survey, GSS, or American National Election Studies, ANES). Egos also
identify how ―close‖ they feel to each alter, providing a metric for tie strength. Lastly,
respondents are asked to focus on the first five names they provided, and ―name interpreter‖
questions ask egos a series of questions about each of these five alters.9 Name interpreter
questions include those that ask ego to estimate how each alter would respond to each of the
opinion questions asked previously of ego, whether the alters know each other, and how close
alters are to each other. These answers provide a sense of the attitudinal orientation of alters,
network structure, and tie strength among alters.
The survey yields two types of network data: egocentric and sociocentric. Variables
capturing network structure include degree (i.e., size), density, and average tie strength. Degree
captures the general connectedness of the ego, with higher values indicating greater integration
into the society of judges. Density captures the number of ties among alters as a proportion of the
total number of possible ties among them, measuring the extent to which an ego‘s alters know
and communicate with each other. Higher numbers indicate more connectivity within the
personal network (Valente 1995, 40).10 Tie strength was measured by asking respondents how
close they were to each alter and how close each of the alters were to each other (cercanía).
Closeness, along with UCINET‘s output for network density, are useful measures of the
9

Burt (1984) considered the number of alters for the network battery included in the US General Social Survey

(GSS); he suggested three as a minimum number, and ultimately decided on five, citing evidence that people can
only hold five to seven significant ―data chunks‖ in their head at any one time (citing Miller 1956; Simon 1974).
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High density may also impede the entrance of new ideas (Danowski 1986, cited in Valente 1995, 40).
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cohesiveness of each ego network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 8).11 Following Betsy
Sinclair‘s advice in Fowler et al. (2011), additional variables must control for homophily and
confounders that might be ascribed to context. Homophily is the similarity between nodes on
individual attributes that might cause these individuals to have the attitude of interest. Thus,
control variables include age, progressiveness, ideological orientation, highest level of education,
income, professional position, and judicial district. Regarding age, there is reason to expect that
younger judges may be more open to institutional and jurisprudential changes. Interview
evidence suggests judicial elders are resistant to legal change because these changes tend to
require a new way of performing their job, something they are disinclined to do late in their
careers. Therefore, I expect age to be negatively related to attitude. Further, the dummy variable
for position distinguishes first- from second-instance, appellate judges (1 if second-instance

11

UCINET generates additional measures of network structure, but they are omitted here for various reasons. Of

these other measures, ―brokerage‖ and ―betweenness‖ offer different ways of ―indexing just how ‗central‘ or
‗powerful‘ ego is within their own neighborhood,‖ and structural holes offer a way of measuring structural
inequalities (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 9). ―Reach‖ is dropped because these ego networks are not extracted
from a larger, complete network. Rather, they are collected individually. However, if a sufficient number of ego
networks were collected so that a full network could be generated from the aggregation of the personal cases, then
this calculation could be examined.
Additionally, there are no weak components, or rather, ego is imbedded in a single weak component. That
is, there are no groups of alters for which ego is the only connection to other alters. For this reason, UCINET reports
―1‖ for this variable. Given the single component for each of network, normalizing by network size is not done
(normalizing "is a pretty meaningless exercise" if there are no cases of multiple components among the examined
networks, see, e.g., Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 9). A more detailed analysis of Gould and Fernandez
brokerage roles is possible (i.e., coordinator, consultant, gatekeeper, etc.), but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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magistrado, 0 if first-instance juez). I anticipate that income and position capture seniority,
which should also have a negative relationship with attitude.
Ultimately, the opinions of alters establish the composition of ego‘s network, and the
remaining questions establish the structure of each personal network. Figure 1 visualizes two of
these ego networks—one with many alters and ties among alters and one with few alters and ties
among them—which also convey the structural inequalities described above.12 In Figure 1, node
size varies according to degree and the width of edges between nodes varies according to tie
strength. By definition of the ego network, the ego is connected to all alters, so the ego node and
all ego-alter ties are in light grey in the background. Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for
ego‘s attitude on four issues, network composition on these issues (alters‘ mean attitude), ego‘s
demographic characteristics, and structural features of personal network.

Figure 1. Illustrations of Ego Networks
alter3

alter4

alter2
alter2

ego5

alter4

ego1

alter5

alter1
alter5

alter1

[Table 2 about here]

12

Visualizations generated in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999).
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alter3

Next, I aggregate the egocentric data to generate socio-network data. Given that the
survey targeted all judges in the state, it is reasonable to conclude that some of these judges will
be listing each other as alters. For instance, in the figure above, ego1‘s alter5 may be ego5‘s
alter4, or even ego5 herself; thus, we get a fuller sense of the structure of social relations
between these two judges by finding the ways in which their social structure overlaps. Doing this
for all respondents aggregates ego networks according to alter-alter matches or ego-alter
matches, resulting in a whole network of 113 judges in the state of Michoacán.13 Thus, for all
practical purposes, we have a full network of all judges. The attitudes of judges who did not
participate in the survey are established by averaging the responses provided by participants
(recall that all participants provided their own opinions in the first part of the survey and then
provided an estimate of their alters‘ opinions in the name interpreter battery). After removing
isolates and a number of observations that were missing data, the full network consists of 102
nodes with varying demographic and attitudinal characteristics and 290 edges of varying
strength. The 102 nodes constitute 92.73 percent of the 110 on the official directory of judges. In
addition to the full network of all state judges, these aggregated data include 18 of 19
magistrados on the state supreme court (94.64 percent complete), and 47 of the 49 judges (95.92
percent complete) in the judicial district of the capital, Morelia (including magistrados, who are
based there). Though a purist would consider these networks to be technically incomplete, they
are very nearly complete, and existing research includes examples of sociocentric analysis on
13

113 is more than the 110 judges listed on the official directory of the judiciary, but this directory does not account

for recent personnel changes: indeed, the consultant who administered the survey noted that the interviewer was
turned away from several courts because a judge had either been reassigned or no judge had yet been assigned to the
court; in other cases, a new judge not yet on the official roster/directory was already there and completed the
questionnaire.
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networks ranging in completeness from 65.3 percent to 77.7 percent (e.g., Berardo 2011, 69).
Thus, beyond the egocentric networks above, the aggregation process yields three different
sociocentric networks based on three distinct boundaries in increasing order of size: state
supreme court, judicial district of Morelia, and state. Figure 2 visualizes the largest of these
networks, which is also the target of analysis in the quantitative section below. Node size is
based on number of ties (degree centrality); edge color reflects tie strength (strongest in black);
and node color reflects attitude towards judicial councils (low to high passing from blue, through
yellow, to red).14 Table 3 summarizes statistics for this sociocentric network.
Figure 2. Full network of judges in Michoacán

14

Whole network visualizations generated using Cytoscape 2.8.2 (Smoot et al. 2011).
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In the sociocentric analysis of the network represented in Figure 2, the key explanatory
variable is the mean value of the attitude of each of a node‘s neighbors. Additional explanatory
variables operationalize centrality in the overall network, homophily, and context. The analysis
includes four measures of centrality: degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality.
The entire network is treated as undirected, so all incoming and outgoing ties are treated equally.
Measures of centrality are based on this undirected network, and all measures were generated in
UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999).

Results 1: Egocentric Networks
Given the ordinal dependent variable (ego‘s attitude), I applied ordered probabilistic regressions
to the egocentric data. The main explanatory variable is the mean value of the attitude among the
ego‘s alters, capturing the attitudinal composition of the network. This model approximates what
Valente (1995, 43–45) called a ―personal network exposure‖ model of diffusion.
Focusing on attitudes towards judicial councils, the partial correlation between ego‘s
attitude and alters‘ mean attitude is 0.68 (p<0.01). Table 4 summarizes the regression results.15

15

Ordered logistic regressions must meet the parallel regression assumption, also called the probabilistic odds

assumption. That is, ordered probit (and logit) assume that the effect of the explanatory variables (X) across all
levels of the response variable (Y) is the same, i.e., the size of the coefficients does not change for different values
of Y. A likelihood ratio test implemented at the bottom of each column shows whether the analysis meets that
assumption. Test was implemented using omodel in Stata v.11. See also Dow (2008, 407) and Stata Data Analysis
Examples: Ordered Logistic Regression, UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group.
Available at: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_ologit_output.htm (last accessed February 23, 2012).
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Table 4. Personal networks; ordered probabilistic regression
y = attitudes towards judicial councils (1–5)
1
2
3
Alters‘ mean(y)

0.92**
(0.16)

4

5

1.41**
(0.36)

0.98**
(0.21)

1.04**
(0.21)

1.01**
(0.20)

Size

–0.09
(0.23)

–0.01
(0.15)

–0.03
(0.14)

0.05
(0.14)

Density

0.83
(1.18)

0.18
(0.85)

0.53
(0.87)

0.03
(0.83)

Tie strength (mean)

–0.01
(0.27)

0.42*
(0.18)

0.41*
(0.19)

0.46*
(0.18)

Left

0.32
(0.65)

Right

–0.00
(0.54)
0.07
(0.14)

0.11
(0.15)

0.07
(0.14)

Progressive
Education

0.20
(0.29)

0.02
(0.19)

0.08
(0.20)

0.03
(0.20)

Female

–0.14
(0.38)

–0.20
(0.38)

0.03
(0.39)

0.22
(0.38)

Age

–0.02
(0.02)

–0.02
(0.02)
–0.22
(0.15)

Salary

–0.24
(0.49)

Magistrado
District (Morelia)
Number of obs
LR chi2(4)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Test of parallel regression
assumption (should not be
significant):
chi2(12)
Prob>chi2
** p<.01 *p<.05

0.57
(0.52)

0.38
(0.34)

0.36
(0.39)

0.39
(0.36)

78
33.20
0.0000
0.1918

45
40.91
0.0000
0.3805

78
42.93
0.0000
0.2481

76
48.86
0.0000
0.2929

78
42.26
0.0000
.2442

1.37
0.71

32.13
0.46

16.76
0.94

31.44
0.25

25.99
0.52

22

The key predictor—alter‘s mean(y)—has the expected positive relationship with ego‘s attitude,
and this result is statistically significant. Similarly, mean tie strength has a positive and
statistically significant relationship. These core results hold while controlling for other aspects of
network structure, demographic variables, and judicial district, none of which are significant.
Indeed, the substantive effect of alters‘ attitudes increases as the controls are added.16
Figure 3 clarifies the substantive significance of the main result. Based on Model 5, each
plot graphs the predicted probability of each outcome (1–5) sequentially against alters‘ mean
attitude, shading the area between the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence
interval.17 The probability of the lowest attitude (y=1) is highest where alters‘ mean attitude is at
its lowest; in this instance, there is about a 87 percent likelihood that ego‘s attitude has the lowest
value if alters‘ mean is at its lowest value (Pr(y|x)=Pr(1|1)=.87), and this likelihood declines
rapidly as alters‘ attitude increases. Conversely, there is approximately a 90 percent likelihood of
the highest outcome (y=5) if mean(y) is also at its highest value. This likelihood drops
precipitously if mean(y) decreases, to 60 percent if mean(y)=4, and to only 20 percent if
mean(y)=3. In short, a judge‘s attitude towards judicial councils is shaped by his or her

16

Age, salary, and position (magistrado dummy) are theoretically capturing similar dynamics, and magistrado and

salary are empirically correlated (0.66), so they are not included in the same model. Still, including (1) age and
magistrado or (2) age and salary in the same model did not alter core results.
17

There is no simple, straightforward method for interpreting substantive effect in ordered probabilistic regressions

(Dow 2008). However, graphing the results offers one of the more intuitive ways of conveying substantive
significance. Predicted probabilities were generated using margins and prgen commands in Stata v.11 and setting
other variables at their means, and graphs by using the rarea option. See Long and Freese (2006); Stata Annotated
Output Ordered Logistic Regression. UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group.
Available at: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_ologit_output.htm (last accessed November 26, 2011).
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colleagues‘ attitudes towards councils. Taken in combination with the finding regarding tie
strength, this is systematic, empirical support for the proposition that intense interaction, a la
Ferree and Miller (1977), promotes ideational diffusion. Contrast with Woods‘s (2008)
proposition that diffuse connections characterize ―judicial communities‖ that generate ideational
consensus; though the role of ―weak ties‖ inherent in her account is not directly tested here, the
positive and significant effect of tie strength cuts against that argument.
Figure 3. Predicted probability of ego’s attitude by alters’ mean attitude

Results for other attitudes, including the criminal procedure reform of 2008, and jurisprudential
attitudes—positivism and deference to higher courts—are in the online appendix. In each
analysis, mean attitude among alters maintains its positive and statistically significant
relationship with ego‘s attitude on the same issue. Further, it is worth noting that higher
education levels have a negative and statistically significant relationship with positivism. That is,
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the traditionally formalistic, technical-legal approach to judging may be losing strength as more
and more judges obtain graduate degrees.

Results 2: Sociocentric Analysis
Moving to the whole network data, Table 5 reports the regression results for attitudes regarding
the judicial council. The key variable of interest—the mean attitude of all contacts one step away
from each judge—has a positive coefficient across all models, providing general
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Table 5. Whole network; ordered probabilistic regression
y = attitudes towards judicial councils (1–5)
1
2
3
Mean(y) for one-step alters
Degree

0.43**
(0.14)

0.47**
(0.14)

0.46**
(0.14)

4

5

6

0.35**
(0.15)

0.48**
(0.14)

0.42**
(0.15)

–0.05
(0.05)

0.03
(0.05)

Betweenness

0.00
(0.00)

Closeness

0.00
(0.00)

Eigenvector

3.66
(2.63)

Female

–0.36
(0.26)

Magistrado

–0.40
(0.37)

Morelia18

–0.21
(0.28)

Number of obs
102
102
102
102
LR chi2(4)
11.98
12.93
14.38
15.49
Prob > chi2
0.0025
0.0048
0.0024
0.0014
Pseudo R2
0.0514
0.0554
0.0616
.0664
Test of parallel regression assumption (should not be significant):
chi2(12)
2.48
4.50
4.26
2.92
Prob>chi2
0.87
0.88
0.89
0.97
** p<.01 * p<.05

102
14.00
0.0029
.0600

102
16.75
0.0102
0.0718

3.48
0.94

18.96
0.3945

support for the proposition that a judge‘s attitude towards council reform increases as the attitude
towards said reform increases among a judge‘s close colleagues. This result is also statistically

18

There are twenty-three judicial districts in the state. Initially, twenty-one dummies captured the districts

individually (two districts were unrepresented in the data). However, only one district had any significance
(Zinapecuaro) relating to a single judge, and there were no meaningful departures from the results here. Judicial
districts were then collapsed into three categories: Morelia, west of Morelia, and east of Morelia. Again, there were
no meaningful differences compared with the results here.
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significant across all models. Indeed, even controlling for various measures of centrality,
homophily, and context, the result regarding direct contact remains.
It should be noted, however, that the analysis reported in Table 5 was conducted with
network weights based on a valued adjacency matrix (W2). Additional analysis with a simple
binary adjacency matrix (W1) yielded no statistically significant results (findings not reported
here). Stated otherwise, the mere presence of a direct relation between ego and alter is not
sufficient to influence ego‘s attitude; rather, the influence of direct relations is contingent on the
strength or intensity of that relation. Thus, the sociocentric analysis generates no support for H2
but strong support for H3. The findings clearly complement the findings from the egocentric
analysis, where both alters‘ mean attitude and tie strength mattered.
Turning to the other variables, none of the centrality measures have a statistically
significant relationship with the respondent‘s attitude, so there is no support for H1. Therefore,
the results support the conclusion that general social location (captured by centrality), in and of
itself, matters less than the strength of direct relations. Measures of homophily (sex and position)
are not consistently significant, but in several alternative specifications (not reported here),
female has a negative relationship at the .10 level of significance. For instance, controlling for
closeness centrality, judicial district, and position, female exerts a negative effect (p=0.08).
Further, in all auxiliary models the coefficient for magistrado has a negative sign. Both of these
results complement the findings from the egocentric analysis in the previous section.
Clarifying further, Figure 4 graphs predicted probabilities across response categories,
setting the remaining variables at their means. As was the case with the prior egocentric analysis,
each graph plots the predicted probability of each outcome (1–5; y-axis) against alters‘ mean
attitude, weighted by the valued adjacency matrix (x-axis).
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Figure 4. Predicted probability of ego’s attitude as a function of alters’ mean attitude

Two patterns should be highlighted from these graphs. First, the slope of the probability curves
in the graphs supports the expected relationships. Specifically, in the first graph, it is more likely
that ego will hold the most negative attitude towards judicial councils if her peers hold a negative
attitude. Conversely, in the last graph, it is dramatically more likely that a judge will hold the
most positive attitude towards judicial councils if her peers hold a positive attitude than if they
hold the most negative attitude. Second, however, the relationship is only clearly significant for
the highest value of the outcome variable. Thus, the evidence is still complementary of the
egocentric analysis, but only for the highest value of the outcome variable.
As a robustness check I applied a linear network autocorrelation model (Butts 2008).19
Linear network autocorrelation is not exactly appropriate given the ordinal response variable.
19

Following Butts (2008), I employed lnam using the sna package in R.

28

Nonetheless, linear models generally yield robust results with ordinal variables, and results
should at least be instructive. Various specifications of the network effects model (Butts 2008;
Dow 2007) yielded results that were supportive of the core finding that social interaction,
especially intense interaction, shapes one's attitudes (results not reported here). Indeed, the
findings were statistically more significant than the 2SCML methods detailed above, suggesting
that the core results from the 2SCML reported in full above are the most conservative.
In sum, quantitative analyses of network diffusion for ego- and sociocentric data
complement each other in showing that two factors influence ego‘s attitude: (1) alters‘ mean
attitude, and (2) the strength of ties, i.e., the intensity of interactions.

Results 3: Qualitative Network Analysis
Triangulating further, qualitative methods yield additional insights regarding the core findings of
the causal role of intense interaction from the quantitative analysis above and elucidate
mechanisms of diffusion. The substantive part of the analysis addresses two issues—(1) external
validity of network structure, and (2) validity of causal inferences—and draws on a set of five
personal, in-depth interviews with judges who participated in the survey generating the network
data above. These judges are nodes 313, 2174, 2690, 3646, and 4635 in Figure 2.
Table 6 summarizes features of the interview sample. First, these five judges constitute
low-residual observations, as evidenced by their ―typicality‖ scores.20 All of the interview
participants are in the top half of typicality scores, and two of them are in the top 10 percent.
20

I follow Gerring and Seawright (2007) in calculating the absolute value of residuals, but given the ordinal level of

measurement there is not as much variation in typicality. Therefore, I rank observations within each category by the
predicted probability of the outcome, in essence yielding typicality scores ranked by the ―confidence‖ in that
typicality score.
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Thus, these are promising observations in which we might expect to find additional evidence of
the central argument (Lieberman 2005). All observations are central according to various
network measures. Further, the sample consists of four men and one woman, two judges from the
interior of the state and three magistrados from the state capital, Morelia.

Degree
centrality rank

Betweenness
centrality rank

Closeness
rank

Eigenvector
centrality rank

Sex

post

Morelia

313
2174
2690
3646
4635

Mean(y)

ID

Typicality
rank

Table 6. Features of interviewees

8
18
39
25
9

4.6
5.0
4.3
4.7
4.7

3
2
33
7
1

4
1
47
11
2

1
2
37
7
4

1
3
16
6
2

M
F
M
M
M

Juez
Mag
Mag
Mag
Juez

N
Y
Y
Y
N

In January 2012, six months after the administration of the survey, these judges were
reminded of the questionnaire and shown a visualization of the judicial network for the full state
as well as a visualization of the network for the state supreme court. They were then asked to
focus on two questions: (1) whether the network structure reflected their own mental image of
social relations among judges (external validity), and (2) what meaning they themselves
attributed to those ties and the network structure now visualized.
Regarding external validity, 2174, 2690, and 3646—all magistrados—immediately
recognized the visualization of the STJ network as a fair representation of a split between
primarily two groups of judges—a core group of more progressive judges spearheading changes
in institutional design and jurisprudence. Each of these judges also spontaneously volunteered
his or her guesses about which magistrados were part of the core group and which were more
peripheral; a clear majority of these guesses were correct. Thus, the transition from questionnaire
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to network visualization appears to faithfully reproduce social structures that members of the
court recognize in their daily interactions.
Beyond external validity, 2690 acknowledged that the individuals he listed as contacts in
his discussion group are people he considers influential for his own way of thinking. He
explicitly stated that these contacts shape the way he thinks about the law, legal conflicts, and
institutional design. For instance, he noted an example in which he called one of his principal
contacts, 1660, now retired and not included in the network, to discuss a particular legal matter
and how the conversation with 1660 changed his perspective on the topic.
Similarly, 2174 noted that she feels influenced by those individuals with whom she is in
contact. Asked specifically whether the people with whom she interacts most frequently—her
judicial discussion group—shaped her attitudes and ideas, she affirmed that this was the case.
Over time and sustained interactions, she said, this group has come to have similar ideas. Pressed
to give examples of this sort of phenomenon, 2174 noted that she relies on her discussion group
contacts—and her contacts rely on her—for information and advice regarding novel legal issues
that arise in cases and insights regarding institutional conflicts and political conflicts outside the
judiciary that might affect the institution. For instance, regarding jurisprudential issues, 2174
recalled a conversation with one of her contacts in which she came to understand a particular
legal concept from a different perspective. That is, judges might share entirely new legal
concepts with each other, but they might also come to understand existing legal concepts from an
entirely new vantage point.
Judges 313 and 4635 clarified this dynamic further. Both named 3646 as very influential
in the way they think about both judicial councils and criminal procedure. Both also named 2714
as influential in the way they think about responsibility in criminal law. They mentioned the
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concepts of ―dolo‖ and ―culpa‖—both of which are used to establish different degrees of
culpability, or elements of ―mens rea‖ in criminal offenses. These concepts generally have very
strict and inflexible interpretations in Mexican law, but due to interactions with 2174 both judges
came to adopt a more flexible interpretation of these concepts, particularly variations of ―dolo.‖21
Asked specifically whether they interacted frequently with 3646, 2174, or their other
named contact due to shared ideas or whether they held similar ideas because of the frequency of
interactions, both affirmed the latter. For instance, both 313 and 4635 were students of 3646 in
law school, though in separate years, so they were exposed to 3646‘s ideas in academic settings
and came to hold similar attitudes regarding legal issues. Further, they have both matured
professionally under the mentorship of 2174, first working for her and then interacting with her
as they ascended through different positions and district posts. The early professional contact
with 2174 set the stage for sustained interaction over time, and both 313 and 4635 said they have
come to adopt some of her ideas (e.g., regarding dolo, as noted above).
Separately, 313 and 4635 said they have both worked, at different times, in some of the
most difficult districts in the state, including those districts where organized crime has a strong
presence (e.g., Lázaro Cárdenas and Apatzingán). While judges in these districts, they faced
bribe attempts and complex legal cases and also had to coexist alongside witnesses, victims, and
offenders in communities heavily populated with individuals connected to organized crime. They
were able to successfully navigate these challenges, and as a result colleagues seek them out for

21

―Dolo‖ is equivalent to deliberate criminal intent—intending to commit or allow an act to be committed knowing

(or acknowledging the possibility) that said act is criminal—while ―culpa‖ is equivalent to criminal negligence—
unintentionally committing a crime out of recklessness or carelessness (see Zamora et al. 2004, 352–53).

32

advice when faced with similar situations. This, they said, may account for their prominence in
the network.
In sum, the interview evidence supports the network influence finding from the statistical
analysis, adding context and depth regarding certain structural features of the network. Further,
regarding mechanisms of diffusion, interviews identified academic and professional mentorship
relations as mechanisms underlying the diffusion profession. Indeed, since most judges in
Michoacán come from the state‘s main public law school (following a pattern seen across the
Mexican states), professors in these institutions who are concurrently or subsequently also judges
may be particularly influential. This insight resonates with Katz et al.‘s (2011) findings regarding
the ―infectiousness of ideas‖ among law professors and clerks.

Conclusions and Implications
The project makes three core contributions. First, I contribute original data based on a survey of
these judges. These data cover a wide range of judicial attitudes, as well as structural properties
of judicial networks. The data demonstrate that network-oriented research with original surveys
is feasible with ―hard-to-reach‖ populations such as judges in less developed settings, even
where there are substantial security considerations. Second, the network batteries of the survey
yield egocentric data, and these egocentric data can be aggregated to form sociocentric data at
three levels of analysis: judicial district, state supreme court, and entire state. Finally, a mixedmethods causal analysis—combining two forms of quantitative analysis in addition to in-depth
interviews—yields consistent findings regarding the diffusion of ideas across judicial networks.
Concretely, I find that ideas diffuse among judges who are in intense interaction with
each other. This finding is supported by analysis of egocentric data, showing that the mean

33

attitude of a judge‘s close contacts shapes that judge‘s own attitudes and that the strength of ties
also contributes to ego‘s attitude. Aggregating the egocentric data to form sociocentric data at the
level of the entire state and applying different techniques, I find complementary evidence that
strong, direct interaction with one‘s colleagues shapes judges‘ attitudes. These findings hold
while controlling for a range of other network variables, demographic characteristics, and
context.
In the future, this project aims to expand to other states and countries in order to gather
additional data on judicial networks, test the generalizability of arguments, and measure different
kinds of legal networks. Whether the findings reported here hold across different policy areas—
institutional and jurisprudential—is also a question of major interest. Additional research
questions regarding tie formation and tie degradation offer compelling prospects for the future.
Overall, the findings are broadly suggestive of a relationship between structure and
agency. If social structure has a powerful influence over ideas and behavior, then agency may
not always be a fully conscious, deliberative phenomenon, as work on ―satisficing‖ and mental
shortcuts has suggested (Simon 1985).22 Nonconscious influences have deep implications for the
nature of the relationship between structure and agency across multiple arenas, including
rationalist, decision-theoretic approaches to behavior. Beyond cognitive shortcuts, however, our
individual decisions are not independent of other individuals; they are imbedded in a dependent
web of relations. Thus, what appears to be an individualistic, conscious decision may in fact be
22

The debate over conscious and nonconscious cognitive processes also has roots in the social movements literature.

For instance, the framing of ideas, identities, or other nonmaterial reasons for joining a movement may be
nonconscious or not fully formed consciously at early movement stages; however, once the movement is
established, framing and messaging become much more conscious and strategic (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996, 6, 16).
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the result of the nonconscious influence of social structure. Put simply if crudely, whom we
know affects what we know, and without us even knowing it!
On a more practical level, the findings have concrete policy implications for the judicial
leadership in states like Michoacán. Trainings and other fora where judges can interact and share
ideas are ripe environments in which to bring judges in contact with new ideas or expose judges,
clerks, and other staff to new ways of thinking. Judicial leaders have great control over who is
invited to speak at these events. Perhaps more importantly, judicial leaders have control over
how frequently and intensely judges interact in these events. For instance, are these events
lectures or more interactive, engaging kinds of activities? Beyond trainings and formal settings,
how do judges interact informally, perhaps even outside the workplace? Are there smaller
settings or activities in which judges can be selectively invited to exchange ideas with judicial
leaders, academics, or even prominent judges from other jurisdictions? Can judges be
encouraged to attend particular conferences or workshops? Also, can judicial leaders leverage
information on the centrality of individual colleagues to affect the flow and diffusion of ideas,
inviting very central individuals to small-group sessions on new or proposed reforms or,
conversely, inviting peripheral individuals to larger sessions or sessions led by more central
individuals? Answers to each of these questions will depend on local conditions and capabilities,
but these are the kinds of policy implications that flow from the results.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Egocentric Data
Variable
N
Mean
Ego Attitudes
Judicial Councils
78
4.24
Criminal Procedure
71
3.97
Same Sex Marriage
78
3.36
Deference to Higher Courts
78
3.58
Positivism
78
4.08
Military Jurisdiction
78
2.58
Network Composition (mean alter attitude)
Judicial Councils
78
4.25
Criminal Procedure
76
4.12
Same Sex Marriage
74
2.96
Deference to Higher Courts
76
3.54
Positivism
76
3.95
Military Jurisdiction
74
2.73
Network Structure
Size
78
2.81
Density
78
0.37
closeness (mean tie strength)
78
3.99
Ego Demographic Data
Progressive
78
6.10
Education (highest level)
78
2.47
Female
78
0.31
Age
78
44.18
Salary
76
4.78

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Sociocentric Data
Variable
N
Mean
Ego Attitude (Judicial Councils)
102
4.22
Network Weighted Mean
102
3.13
Female
102
0.31
Magistrado
102
0.18
Morelia
102
0.46
Degree
102
5.18
Betweenness
102
100.30
Closeness
102
1744
Eigenvector
102
0.07
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S.D.

Min

Max

1.20
1.19
1.64
1.62
1.10
1.51

1
1
1
1
1
1

5
5
5
5
5
5

0.91
0.87
1.38
1.37
1.01
1.25

1.67
2
1
1
1
1

5
5
5
5
5
5

1.15
0.20
0.87

1
0
1

5
50
5

1.03
0.80
0.46
7.42
1.31

2
1
0
32
2

7
3
1
62
7

S.D.
1.16
0.93
0.47
0.38
0.50
3.67
172.04
2292
0.07

Min
1
0.80
0
0
0
1
0.00
1030
0.00

Max
5
5.00
1
1
1
17
748.39
10202
0.30

Appendix A.
Social network analysis examines either whole networks or personal networks. Each
approach has its strengths and weaknesses. Whole networks include a full set of relational ties
provided or reported by each member of the network. In generating original survey-based data,
this high information requirement means the survey sample must consist of the full population of
the network. A weakness of this approach is that the boundary is almost always set arbitrarily, so
relations beyond this arbitrary boundary are left out. For instance, a ―whole‖ classroom network
is imbedded within a larger school network, but the data collection strategy treats these other
relations as absent. Another weakness is that gathering data on all relational ties becomes
increasingly difficult as network size increases; thus, this approach is infeasible with networks
larger than approximately a hundred members.
In personal networks, all the information about the network comes from the ego; that is,
the ego reports her or his own opinions and identifies the people with whom she or he interacts.
This information provides the size of the personal network, and the ego then reports on the
characteristics of alters, the quality of the ego‘s tie with each alter, and on ties among alters. The
accuracy of the ego‘s responses regarding alters and alter-alter relations is not that important;
since the analysis examines the influence of the network on the ego at its center, ego‘s subjective
perception of the qualities of alters and of their relations matters more than objective accuracy
(Sinclair in Fowler et al. 2011). Strengths of this method include the ease of implementation in
survey analysis (network batteries) or interviews. Weaknesses include the fact each personal
network is almost certainly larger than any survey could capture, so relevant ties may be lost, and
the ego network cannot be studied as part of a broader society. Table 1 summarize the trade-offs
between these two approaches.
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Table 1. Trade-offs between ego- and sociocentric data
Ego
Socio
Easier to collect own data from
Can see broader group or
Strengths
medium-sized and large
society
populations
Statistical analysis is more
straightforward
Weaknesses Lack sense of connectedness
within broader group or society
Sampling may not yield
independent observations
(always true to at least some
degree, especially if take idea of
―small worlds‖ seriously)

Can estimate network features
and effects across broader
group/society
Harder to collect original
personal data
Network boundary can be
arbitrary—not clear that it
corresponds with reality; i.e.,
cannot see others who might
exert influence
Statistical analysis is more
difficult
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